Editorial by Richardson, A. P.
Journal of Accountancy 
Volume 49 Issue 3 Article 1 
3-1930 
Editorial 
A. P. Richardson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa 
 Part of the Accounting Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richardson, A. P. (1930) "Editorial," Journal of Accountancy: Vol. 49 : Iss. 3 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa/vol49/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Accountancy by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information, 
please contact egrove@olemiss.edu. 
The Journal of Accountancy
Official Organ of the American Institute of Accountants
A. P. Richardson, Editor
[Opinions expressed in THE JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY are not necessarily en­
dorsed by the publishers or by the American Institute of Accountants. Articles are 
chosen for their general interest, but beliefs and conclusions are often merely those of 
individual authors. ]




It is to be hoped that we shall not be 
suspected of introducing a highly con­
troversial question of national impor­
tance into the columns of a technical journal if we discuss a recent 
decision of the supreme court of the United States in the case of 
the Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Company; nor, we trust, shall 
we be charged with a refusal to accept the decisions of the court 
or with a lack of respect for its members if, in the course of discus­
sion, we question the validity of the arguments by which the 
decision is supported in the opinion handed down. The case is 
interesting to accountants in more ways than one. The point at 
issue—whether under the tax law an allowance should be made 
for obsolescence of goodwill—is itself an interesting technical 
question. The decisions in the courts below turned largely on the 
legislative history of tax provisions, which accountants played an 
important part in formulating, and the whole history of the case 
indicates the strange turns of fortune to which taxpayers may be 
subject. We propose, therefore, to consider it in some detail.
Let us deal first with the proceedings in 
the supreme court. As has been said, 
the question at issue was whether or not 
under the revenue act of 1918 an allowance could be made for the 
obsolescence of goodwill. No question of fact was in dispute. In 
the language of the opinion, “The goodwill was that of a brewery 
and is found to have been destroyed by prohibition legislation. 
The deduction claimed is for the fiscal year ending May 31, 1919, 
it having been apparent early in 1918 that prohibition was im- 
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minent, and the officers having taken steps to prepare for the total 
or partial liquidation of the company. The amount of the deduc­
tion to be made is agreed upon if any deduction is to be allowed.” 
The sole contention of the government, which brought the appeal, 
was that in the provisions of the revenue act of 1918 relating to 
exhaustion, wear and tear and obsolescence, “the statute only 
intended to embrace property of such a nature that it was de­
creased, consumed or disposed of by use in the trade or business, 
.and goodwill is not such property.”
As between the parties, nothing turned 
on the nature of the event which de­
stroyed the goodwill. The govern­
ment’s position would have been precisely the same had the case 
been one of a business brought to an end by an unexpected ex­
haustion of the world’s supply of its raw material. The court, 
however, decided against the taxpayer, on the ground that neither 
of the words “exhaustion” and “obsolescence” was apt to de­
scribe termination by law as an evil of a business otherwise flour­
ishing; and that to make such an allowance would be to grant 
part compensation to the taxpayer for the extinguishment of his 
business by law, in the form of “an abatement of taxes otherwise 
due,” and that it was incredible that congress should have in­
tended such a result. But it is difficult to perceive how any 
question arises of abatement of taxes otherwise due. The profits 
for the last years of the company’s operation had to be determined 
and taxed. The fact, conceded on the record, that the useful life 
of the capital assets of the business was to be cut short, was 
claimed to be under general provisions a factor which would re­
duce the taxable income and the tax. The revenue act did not 
exclude breweries from the benefit of these provisions. The tax­
payer had been guilty of nothing illegal. Upon what theory, 
then, can the taxpayer be denied the benefit of the provisions and 
its tax increased by such denial? If the general provisions would 
not give the relief sought, if the premature termination of the use­
ful life of an asset employed in a business which is brought to an 
unexpected end is not covered by the terms used in the act, the 
taxpayer has no right to succeed. But if they would afford that 
relief, there is nothing in the revenue act, nor surely in considera­
tions of public policy, to deprive the taxpayer of the benefit on 
account of the nature of the event which brought the business to a
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premature end. Congress, acting within its powers, saw fit to 
enact prohibition without compensation; but there is nothing to 
suggest that it intended to impose an added burden on the in­
dustries affected by requiring that their taxable income, during 
the short period of legal operation left them, should, by an excep­
tion to a general rule, be determined as if that period had been 
unlimited. The opinion, we think, does an injustice to congress 
when it imputes to congress such an intention.
Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Jus­
tice Stone concurred in the result, but 
wrote no opinion. Their decision prob­
ably turned on the question of the applicability of the clause
relied upon to goodwill in general, rather than on the interpreta­
tion of the attitude of congress toward a business which had 
become noxious to the constitution, which led to the rather sum­
mary dismissal of the taxpayers’ contentions by Mr. Justice 
Holmes. The only words in his opinion which seem to bear di­
rectly on this question are contained in the sentence: “Neither 
word is apt to describe termination by law as an evil of a business 
otherwise flourishing, and neither becomes more applicable be­
cause the death is lingering rather than instantaneous.” It may 
be that if the effect of the decision as an authority comes to be 
considered in a future case, the declaration that neither word 
[exhaustion or obsolescence] is apt to describe the termination 
of a business otherwise flourishing will be held to have been the 
basis of the decision, and the references to the prohibition law to 
have been merely obiter dicta. Accurately speaking, the question 
is perhaps whether either “exhaustion” or “obsolescence” is or 
is not an apt term to describe the effect on capital assets of an 
event which is about to bring a prosperous business in which they 
are employed to an unexpected end, rather than whether the 
words are apt to describe the event itself or not. In considering 
such a question, an examination of the history of the legislation 
and of the practice of the treasury would seem, under the deci­
sions of the court, to be pertinent if not essential.
A Question 
of Tense
In the bureau of internal revenue and in 
the court below, the question had turned 
on the interpretation of the provision of 
section 234 (a) of the revenue act of 1918, allowing as a deduction 
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from gross income, inter alia, “a reasonable allowance for the ex­
haustion, wear and tear of property used in the trade or business, 
including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence.” Acting 
under this authority, the treasury in 1919 issued a regulation pro­
viding for an allowance for obsolescence of goodwill of breweries as 
a result of prohibition. This ruling remained in effect from 1919 
until 1927. In 1927, a case having come into the courts on the 
question whether or not the goodwill had, in fact, been destroyed 
in that case, a district court held that the provision relied on did 
not authorize a deduction in any case for obsolescence of goodwill. 
This decision being affirmed by the circuit court of appeals, the 
commissioner amended the regulations so as to deny the deduc­
tion. It is to be presumed that the great majority of the cases 
had been decided under the regulations in force from 1919 to 
1927, so that only a small residue of taxpayers was affected by the 
change of position. The circuit court of appeals, in deciding the 
case referred to (the Red Wing Malting Company case), held that 
the language, “including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence,” 
did not add a new kind of deduction, and that the allowance for 
“exhaustion, wear and tear of property used in the trade or busi­
ness” covered no more than the provision of the 1916 act, which 
allowed a deduction for the “exhaustion, wear and tear of prop­
erty arising out of its use or employment in the business or trade,” 
and that therefore exhaustion was not allowable unless caused by 
use. This conclusion was based largely on the court’s reading of 
the legislative history of the provision, a history which is of par­
ticular interest to accountants.
The corporation excise tax law of 1909 
allowed the deduction of “a reasonable 
allowance for depreciation of property, 
if any.” This act is memorable because it led to the first oc­
casion on which the accountants of the country as a body pre­
sented the views of the profession on what they conceived to be 
unsound legislation and also the first occasion on which members 
of the profession were called in to assist in framing regulations to 
give effect to an apparently unworkable act. Since the tax was 
in terms based on receipts and payments, any allowance for de­
preciation might seem incongruous if it were not well understood 
that the law was conceived and was to be administered as an 
income or profits tax, and that the words “received” and “paid”
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were used as what has since come to be known as camouflage, 
which was expected to protect the law from attack on constitu­
tional grounds. In the regulations, the term “depreciation” was 
interpreted in the accounting rather than the etymological sense, 
and it was provided that the deduction should be “the loss which 
arises from exhaustion, wear and tear or obsolescence out of the 
use to which the property is put.” There was, however, a dis­
position in the treasury to make the determination of the allow­
ance at least in part a question of value rather than of exhaustion.
When the revenue act of 1913 was 
being prepared, a committee of the 
American Association of Public Ac­
countants, predecessor of the American Institute of Accountants, 
conferred with those who were drafting the bill and recommended, 
among other things, that the sense of the regulation under the 
1909 act should be embodied in the text of the act of 1913. 
That act, when passed, provided for “a reasonable allowance 
for depreciation by use, wear and tear of property, if any.” 
It was, however, apparent that depreciation of property used, 
which ought to be allowed, might arise while the property was in 
use, but not by or from use. Such allowances were commonly 
made by the treasury under the act of 1913 and also under the 
act of 1916. In 1918, income taxation had assumed a new im­
portance, and, the 1917 law having proved almost unworkable, 
the treasury, for the first time, was allowed to draft a law. The 
bill, as it passed the house, provided for “a reasonable allowance 
for exhaustion, wear and tear of property used in the trade or 
business.” The senate amended the provision to read, “a reason­
able allowance for depreciation of property used in the trade or 
business.” The conference committee changed the provision 
to read as it now stands, “a reasonable allowance for exhaustion, 
wear and tear of property used in the trade or business, including 
a reasonable allowance for obsolescence.” The reasonable 
interpretation of the intent of congress would seem to be that in 
1918 it sanctioned the previous practice of allowing deductions for 
exhaustion of property used, even though that exhaustion 
resulted not from use but from other causes such as lapse of time, 
and that it specifically provided for consideration of the element 
of obsolescence in determining the allowance. It was upon this 
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specifically allowing obsolescence of goodwill in the case of brew­
eries, was formulated. The circuit court of appeals in the 
eighth circuit appears from the record to have based its decision 
adverse to this regulation in the Red Wing Malting Company 
case on a reading of this history which was not entirely accurate. 
The circuit court of the second circuit, in a careful opinion in the 
Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Company case, sustained the 
regulation. It was on this narrow point of statutory construction 
that the latter case went to the supreme court, there to be 
decided, as we have said, on a point which apparently had not 
been considered by anyone in the ten years’ history of the 
question.
This history strikingly illustrates the 
hazards involved in taking a tax case 
to court. The Red Wing Malting
The Hazard 
of Court
Company, presumably convinced of the soundness of its position 
on the question of fact which was at issue in the treasury (i.e., 
whether its goodwill had been destroyed or not), went to the 
courts only to have its contention on the question of fact sustained 
but the allowance denied as a matter of law on the basis of a 
new meaning read into the statute in the light of the previous 
legislative history of the question. The Haberle Crystal Springs 
Brewing Company, having succeeded in convincing one circuit 
court of appeals that the other circuit court had erred in its 
reading of legislative history and its legislative construction, 
was taken to the supreme court on this narrow question, only to 
have its case decided on a point which had never been urged or 
argued.
The Off Year in 
Legislation
Every second year in the history of 
legislation is a time of comparative 
calm for American accountants and
with equal regularity the intervening years are filled with fear 
and uncertainty. No year is altogether free of the trammels of 
doubt, for there is always a legislature or two which is about 
to meet or is meeting, and whenever that happens the accountant 
is in danger of something new and strange. This year of grace 
1930 is an off year. There are only ten states or territories whose 
legislative bodies are required to assemble. Others, it is always 
true, may be called in special session, but that is not probable.
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The public is not indulgent in its judgment of the need for special 
sessions, and legislators themselves are not so apt to be led 
astray into unnecessary convention as they once were. It may 
be assumed, therefore, that the only legislatures which imperil 
accountancy and other things this year will be those of Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina and Virginia, which met in January, that 
of Porto Rico, which met in February and that of Louisiana, 
which is to meet in May. Ten legislatures, it is quite true, can 
do a great deal of harm, but in comparison with the potential 
accomplishments of forty or more legislatures meeting in the odd 
years, the menace of the even year seems almost negligible. 
And then, of course, it should not be forgotten that any legislature 
may enact laws or amend existing laws to the general benefit of 
mankind or perhaps to the particular assistance of the accountant. 
It is not fair to disregard the occasional good work done by 
legislatures. Often the members of these institutions are imbued 
with a genuine desire to right a wrong or to relieve intolerable 
conditions, and in a good many cases they succeed. The unfor­
tunate truth that most legislation is either unnecessary or vicious 
is not or should not be the only factor in the public’s estimation. 
Until we come to a completely benevolent autocracy or a pure 
anarchy, we seem destined to suffer legislative interference. 
It is not ideal at all, but it is practical, at any rate in our present 
undeveloped condition.
The dangers which lurk in legislative 
halls are not pointed solely at account­
ants. There are many other people 
engaged in equally respectable pursuits whose activities are sub­
ject to constant meddling. If accountancy seems sometimes to 
be singled out for special attack it must be remembered that 
accountants themselves are largely to blame. Wherever there is 
a law which grants peculiar rights and titles to a select class or 
group there will always be clamorous members of the community 
crying out that their liberties are in jeopardy or that they too 
should be stamped with the seal of state sanction. Those fellows 
from the outside crowding into the corridors of capitols are 
accountants of sorts. Some of them are good accountants, 
some are miserable accountants, others are merely accountants 
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legislator who is not adept in the separation of good and evil 
among the claimants to proficiency may be forgiven if now and 
then he pays too much heed to the protests of the protestant. 
It is most improbable that any legislator, except when personal 
friends or supporters are concerned, feels much interest in the 
form or administration of laws governing professional practice of 
accountancy. He has other more magnetic matters drawing his 
attention. But when a vociferous demand for new law or amend­
ment is made he listens to it, and in the absence of special knowl­
edge he may be misled. A great deal of legislation has been 
needed to bring accountancy to its present place in the esteem 
of the public and as conditions change there will be necessity for 
other enactments. No one can deny that. The sad thing is that 
many of the efforts to amend are dictated by nothing more 
disinterested than a party of outs trying to be ins.
There will be attempts this year to 
maim or kill existing statutes and some 
of them may be sufficiently serious to 
merit attention, but so far as we have heard nothing of a grave 
significance has been introduced in any of the legislatures which 
are in session, and as most of the ten legislatures are nearing the 
conclusion of what they love to describe as their labors, it seems 
justifiable to hope that nothing injurious will be done. In some 
states there are laws which could be improved by amendment. 
There are crude or undesirable provisions in many laws, and as 
time goes on it will be expedient to change them, but when the 
effort is made it should be only after careful deliberation by 
accountants themselves in their societies. Individual attempts 
to alter laws are generally ill advised and productive of failure or 
worse. Much of the existing fault in laws is due to an unseemly 
haste to have something on the statute books. If the accountants 
in each state had worked harmoniously together, if all opinions 
had been discussed, if the interests of everyone had been con­
sidered and so far as possible protected, and if then there had 
been a united effort to present the case to legislators, we should 
have today a great deal better laws than we have and there would 
not be half the bitterness and opposition which is so frequently 
encountered. No law can be equally acceptable to all men and 
there will be opponents always. But the new tendency manifest 
in some parts of the country to give thought to the opinions of all
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concerned will do much to remove honest enmity. It is useless 
to deplore the lack of unity in many past instances. The great 
point now is to take care that the reforms which are yet to be 
made be made after thorough preparation. If that be done the 
biennial peril of the odd years and the modified peril of the even 
will shrink and become controllable, to the infinite joy of us all.
Confirmation of Secu­
rities in Transfer
In recent issues of The Journal of 
Accountancy we referred, at times in a 
spirit of irony, to the difficulty which 
has arisen, especially in the audit of brokerage houses, in obtain­
ing confirmation of securities held by transfer agents. The com­
ments evoked a good deal of correspondence, and both transfer 
agents and accountants have been seeking a settlement of the 
difficulty. It appears, according to the transfer agents, that the 
enormous volume of securities submitted for transfer renders the 
task of verifying extremely heavy and these transfer agents feel 
that it is fair to make a charge for the service. Accountants felt 
that something must be done in order at least to ensure attention 
to requests for confirmation. The Bulletin of the American In­
stitute of Accountants reports that a meeting was held on January 
21st at which there were representatives of the principal transfer 
agents and of the accounting profession, when a tentative agree­
ment was reached that for a period of six months a charge of $1 
for each item confirmed should be made. Whether this charge 
will prove excessive or not remains to be seen, but in any case the 
accountant can avoid any appearance of extortion by specifying 
to his client the amount of the demand by the bank or other trans­
fer agent for confirmation. This agreement has been approved by 
a considerable number of companies which have transfer depart­
ments. A few companies will not make any charge for the serv­
ice, but the great majority will charge a fee of $1. A special 
form of request for confirmation has been prepared and is printed 
in the Institute Bulletin issued February 15, 1930.
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